Five Observations on Biosecurity for 2025

I’m publishing this just before the inauguration tomorrow because the real story of 2025 in our world is how the Trump Administration 2.0 will approach the most powerful force on this planet: biology.

In 2025, biosecurity will evolve from a specialized concern to a central issue at the intersection of politics, health, and national defense. The convergence of technological advancements, geopolitical shifts, and recent outbreaks has underscored the urgent need for comprehensive strategies to address biological threats, but legacy feelings about COVID-19 origins and the role of global governance bring the heat up on the conversation.

Here are some predictions — as always, strong opinions, loosely held — bolstered by my observations, all about highlight key areas where biosecurity policy will evolve:

1. Biosecurity is a Tool in High-Stakes Global Politics

The debate over COVID-19’s origins, the WHO’s role in global public health and America’s involvement in it, and increased scrutiny of gain-of-function research have thrust biosecurity into the spotlight. In 2025, it will become a defining aspect of national health and defense agendas. The incoming Trump administration and Republican legislature are expected to quickly address US involvement in the WHO and initiate high-profile investigations into pathogen origins and research practices, elevating both awareness and controversy.

Prediction: These debates will foster bipartisan consensus on the necessity of robust biosecurity measures, with a focus on Chinese capabilities, the growth engineered biology worldwide, biointelligence (BIOINT) — which was prominently mentioned just last week in the hearing for Trump’s CIA director nominee, and AI-bio as critical priorities. Anticipate a restructured biosecurity framework emphasizing national sovereignty, increased scrutiny of international collaborations, and a focus on enhancing domestic capabilities.

2. WHO Withdrawal: A New Global Health Order

I could obviously be wrong, but it appears this will come fast. The US will in all likelihood waste no time in sending a letter to the UN Secretary General stating that it intends to formally withdraw from the WHO one year from the date of the letter. The US could immediately withdraw all involvement in WHO; it also could try to extract concessions from WHO during part or all of that year.

Either way, there will be a seismic shift in global health diplomacy, leadership, and collaboration. Either the U.S. will reassert control and influence at WHO or it will create its own system. This will likely result in a fragmented ecosystem of bilateral and “pluri”-lateral partnerships, and opportunities for strengthened engagement by private sector, industry, academic institutions, and other entities that are sometimes not centrally involved in global diplomacy, policy and strategy. This trend reflects a broader move away from multilateralism toward decentralized, flexible models of global health and biosecurity governance.

Prediction: The U.S. will seek to influence global health policy through direct partnerships rather than through multilateral organizations. Look for alliances between NATO allies, G20 nations, the US government, and private entities as nations seek to reorient and develop robust data-sharing networks and countermeasures for global health crises, independent of traditional frameworks like the WHO. This will be complex to accomplish and will take intensive diplomatic and technical efforts.

3. The Bioweapons Era: A Harrowing Reality

Bioweapons are transitioning from theoretical threats to looming certainties. Consensus across editorial pages (including by me, Matt Pottinger, and Ashish Jha in the Washington Post a few weeks ago) and the intelligence community underscores the imminent risk of engineered pathogens. Lessons from COVID-19 and advances in AI-driven protein design highlight the dual-use nature of emerging biotechnologies and their potential catastrophic impact on global leadership. Plus, every time a naturally derived biothreat evades our public health and biosecurity infrastructure, we are inadvertently exposing massive vulnerabilities that can be leveraged for bioweapons. This is happening more and more.

Just like satellite and surveillance planes (IMINT, MASINT, GEOINT) were urgently needed to monitor the development and deployment of nuclear weapons in the last strategic arms race, we will unfortunately need a new discipline and significant investment in a new domain of BIOINT.

Prediction: Expect new legislation and funding aimed at detecting, deterring, and neutralizing biological threats. Significant investments in biodefense infrastructure will focus on detection and monitoring (BIOINT), rapid response systems, and the development of next-generation vaccines and therapeutics. Partnerships between the defense sector and private biosecurity entities are likely to expand as urgency intensifies.

4. Building 21st Century Health Surveillance Systems: Defense Tech, AI, and Autonomy

Biotechnology is a technology frontier that is being worked on, every day, by brilliant and dedicated human beings and even more intensely by Mother Nature across countless instances of evolution and mutation. Just as we are witnessing our vulnerability to the enormous power of natural disasters across the globe (just think about LA and North Carolina before it), and the increasing rate of these incidents, so will we soon recognize that a massive biotechnological transformation is speeding towards us. This doesn’t even take AGI, which the frontier labs tell us is right around the corner. 2025 can and must mark a moment where the world starts treating the massive power of biology with the weighty respect it deserves.

This means we will move beyond only creating policy solutions (i.e. committees, laws, multilateral organizations) as a solve for the challenges created by these advancements; we must build technology solutions for material problems. American hard tech is experiencing a much-needed resurgence, across companies like SpaceX and Anduril and so many more. Accordingly, in the evolving landscape of global health security, the role of technology companies in developing autonomous health surveillance systems will become increasingly critical. As the U.S. redefines its position in global health, particularly with its imminent withdrawal from traditional governance institutions like the World Health Organization, there is a pressing need for innovative technology company solutions to fill the resulting void and maintain global awareness. Their efforts will help to ensure timely access to critical health data, enhancing national preparedness for biological threats. In order for this data to be maximally useful, systems and business models will need to be developed for better data sharing, ownership, and governance, between the private sector, governments, and multilateral institutions.

Prediction: By the end of 2025, the systems and partnerships spearheaded by these defense tech companies will become indispensable tools for governments seeking reliable, independent biosecurity data. Their contributions will not only fill the gaps left by traditional global health institutions but also set new standards for rapid response and resilience against emerging biological threats.Companies will begin providing biosecurity products that leverage advanced data systems and artificial intelligence to create independent health surveillance and data-sharing networks.

5. AIxBio: The Risks We’re Only Beginning to Understand

AI-bio is reshaping the life sciences, with risks scaling alongside its potential. Recognition of protein design by the Nobel Prize Committee has brought the field’s promise — and its peril — into sharper focus. In 2025, tools for AI-Bio risk assessment and mitigation will become as crucial as the technologies themselves.

Prediction: A surge in oversight for ethical AIxBio use will parallel the rapid development of defensive tools to address emerging risks. Anticipate the introduction of regulatory frameworks aimed at overseeing AI-bio research, ensuring ethical standards, and preventing misuse while promoting scientific progress.

Bonus Thought: The State of the Bugs

From H5N1 to Marburg, headlines are replete with emerging and re-emerging pathogen threats. The question isn’t if we’ll face another pandemic-level threat, but when. (Don’t take it from me, here’s a piece from the Financial Times quoting a recent study from our top epidemiological experts at Ginkgo.)

The current H5N1 avian influenza outbreak has exposed significant challenges in the United States’ preparedness and response strategies. Initially confined to poultry, the virus has now spread to dairy cattle and humans across multiple states. Every week, the infection numbers on our cross-species tracker get more and more worrisome. 2025 saw the first tragic human death, with very worrisome post-infection mutations indicated by sequencing. This week, the entire state of Georgia suspended all poultry production. Poultry is Georgia’s #1 industry.

Critics point to delays and a lack of coordination among federal agencies as key factors that allowed the virus to proliferate. The USDA’s recent nationwide milk testing initiative, while necessary, was implemented months after the virus had become widespread, diminishing its effectiveness. This doesn’t have to be the case: America has a massive industrial base and biosecurity infrastructure that can support effective government response to these threats. Let’s not waste our incredibly hard-won learnings from COVID.

Prediction: In 2025, if there is any acceleration of the H5N1 outbreak, expect calls for a comprehensive review and overhaul of the United States’ biosecurity infrastructure. This should involve increased funding for early detection systems, more robust integration of critical private sector capabilities, improved inter-agency collaboration, and the development of rapid response strategies to contain outbreaks before they escalate. Proactive measures and lessons learned from recent responses will be crucial in mitigating the impact of future biological threats.

Thanks to Karen Hogan, Mitchell Wolfe, Ben Oppenheim, Nita Madhav, Joseph Fridman, Cassandra Philipson, and Mary Tarpy for their helpful comments on this piece, and to the many, many experts in the biosecurity world who inform my thinking. All infelicities and mispredictions are my own.